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ABSTRACT 
The Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE), a NASA Medium-Class Explorer (MIDEX) mission, is surveying the 
entire sky in four bands from 3.4 to 22 microns with a sensitivity hundreds to hundreds of thousands times better than 
previous all-sky surveys at these wavelengths. The single WISE instrument consists of a 40 cm three-mirror anastigmatic 
telescope, a two-stage solid hydrogen cryostat, a scan mirror mechanism, and reimaging optics giving 6″ resolution (full-
width-half-maximum). WISE was placed into a Sun-synchronous polar orbit on a Delta II 7320 launch vehicle on 
December 14, 2009. NASA selected WISE as a MIDEX in 2002 following a rigorous competitive selection process. To 
gain further confidence in WISE, NASA extended the development period one year with an option to cancel the mission 
if certain criteria were not met. MIDEX missions are led by the principal investigator who in this case delegated day-to-
day management to the project manager. With a cost cap and relatively short development schedule, it was essential for 
all WISE partners to work seamlessly together. This was accomplished with an integrated management team 
representing all key partners and disciplines. The project was developed on budget and on schedule in spite of the need 
to surmount significant technical challenges. This paper describes our management approach, key challenges and critical 
decisions made. Results are described from a programmatic, technical and scientific point of view. Lessons learned are 
offered for projects of this type. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The Wide-field Infrared Survey Explorer (WISE) satellite was launched on December 14, 2009, on a Delta II 7320-10 
rocket from Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). It has nearly completed its mission to image at least 95% of the sky at 
four infrared wavelengths: 3.4, 4.6, 12 and 22 microns (bands 1, 2, 3 and 4).  
Figure 1 shows the WISE mission elements, operations approach and responsible organizations.1 The mission system 
comprises a flight system (satellite) and a mission operations system. The project is an all-U.S. effort. 
The flight system payload element2, provided by the Utah State University’s Space Dynamics Laboratory (SDL), is 
based on a 40 cm aperture, all-aluminum telescope with imaging optics that enable simultaneous imaging of the sky in 
all four bands. The telescope and four-detector arrays (each 1 megapixel) are encased in a two-stage solid hydrogen 
cryostat that continues to provide the low temperatures required to operate the detectors and minimize the telescope-
induced background. Payload data processing and control electronics are housed in the spacecraft. The cryostat is a 
derivative of that used for the SDL Spatial Infrared Imaging Telescope (SPIRT) III and the Wide-Field Infrared Explorer 
(WIRE) instruments, which were launched in 1996 and 1999, respectively.  
The flight system spacecraft element3 provides all necessary power, pointing, computing, data storage and 
communications. The 500 watt spacecraft is largely single string with magnetic momentum unloading and Ku and S 
band communications. The spacecraft is a derivative of the Orbital Express NEXTSat target satellite and the Deep 
Impact impactor. It was produced by Ball Aerospace and Technology Corporation (BATC).  
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Figure 1. Mission elements and operations approach 
The mission operations element3,4 includes the command generation and engineering telemetry processing infrastructure 
at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL); science data processing at the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) 
Infrared Processing and Analysis Center (IPAC), which is responsible for data analysis, archive and distribution; and 
science survey planning at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center 
(GSFC) operates the Tracking Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS), which is the sole pathway for commanding and 
data return. NASA’s Kennedy Space Center procures the launch services from United Launch Alliance (ULA) for the 
project. JPL provides the overall project management and mission system engineering.  
Commands and telemetry are via TDRSS S-band, and science data and stored engineering data are down-linked via 
TDRSS Ku band at 100 Mbps. The primary mission must last for 7 months, including 1 month of in-orbit checkout and 
6 months of survey to meet all science requirements. NASA has authorized a 3 month mission extension because the 
cryogen is expected to last for at least 10 months. 
The WISE science instrument is optimized to achieve its two primary science goals:5  
• Study the nature and evolutionary history of ultra-luminous IR galaxies (ULIRGs), and identify the most 
luminous galaxies in the universe. 
• Measure the space density, mass function and formation history of brown dwarf stars in the solar neighborhood, 
identifying the closest stars to the Sun. 
In addition, WISE will address other fundamental topics in astrophysics:  
• Determine the radiometric albedos for almost all known asteroids, including main belt and near-Earth objects 
(>>100,000). 
• Measure the very faint end of the luminosity function of protostars in nearby star formation regions. 
• Contribute to the understanding of the evolution of circumstellar disks. 
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 In 1998, Wright and Eisenhardt proposed a four-band all-sky infrared survey mission, the Next Generation Sky Survey 
(NGSS), as a NASA Medium-Class Explorer (MIDEX) mission. Although it was not selected, it was highly ranked, and 
they were encouraged to re-propose in the next MIDEX opportunity. 
Finally, the current version of the long-sought-after next-generation infrared all-sky survey mission was proposed as a 
NASA MIDEX mission in 2001. It was also named NGSS; the project name was changed to WISE in late 2002 in order 
to avoid confusion with the much larger Next Generation Space Telescope (NGST), which is now the JWST. Phase A, 
project formulation, started in 2002; in 2006, the WISE project as we know it today was confirmed and fully funded for 
detailed design and development. 
In a way, the conceptualization, promotion and development of WISE took 22 years! During that period, improvements 
in technology, especially detectors, made WISE a much more powerful mission than Fazio proposed in 1988, but it is 
basically the same mission. In addition, the intervening smaller steps (2MASS and WIRE) contributed substantial 
heritage to WISE. This brings us to our first of eight lessons learned that we wish to convey to the reader. 
Lesson Learned #1: START YOUNG, KNOW WHAT YOU WANT, BE PERSISTENT AND PATIENT. 
• We had a mature and thorough understanding of our basic objective and were disciplined about staying focused 
on doing that well. 
Following selection in 2003, many threats to project survival remained. As shown in Figure 3, NASA-mandated funding 
changes slowed formulation and preliminary design activities and caused the launch to slip and the cost to grow. During 
this time, the project was under a continuous threat of cancellation in spite of the fact that we had survived a rigorous 
competitive selection process and delivered on all commitments since selection. Between selection and the initial 
confirmation review (ICR) in August, 2004, the launch was delayed due to a 6 month selection delay and the addition of 
an extended 12 month Phase A (probation). Between ICR and the first mission confirmation review (MCR) in 
November, 2005, we were directed to change our launch vehicle from Taurus to Delta II and to co-manifest with an 
unnamed payload. Also, our 2005 budget was halved midyear; as a result, Phase B was extended and we incurred a 12 
month launch slip. Although we “passed” our MCR, our confirmation was put on hold, and our 2006 budget was again 
halved midyear. (We came to call these the “February surprises.”) Phase B was extended again, and launch was slipped 
another 4.5 months. Finally, we were confirmed at our delta MCR (DMCR) in October, 2006, when we committed to a 
launch date of November 1, 2009. We shipped to VAFB in time to support that launch date; but neither the Delta launch 
vehicle nor the Western Test Range was ready to launch us. We waited at VAFB for our launch, which finally occurred 
on the first attempt on December 14, 2009.  
 
Figure 3. Impact of confirmation delays on cost and launch date 
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 Lesson Learned #2: IN CHAOS THERE IS OPPORTUNITY.  
• In spite of the confirmation chaos, rapid replans kept the team focused on achievable objectives, enabling the 
project to maximize productive effort when little progress was expected. 
• Delays allowed us to make some progress on critical, high-risk long-lead items (detectors, cryostat, optics). 
Lesson Learned #3: FEAR OF CANCELLATION IS A POWERFUL MOTIVATOR. 
• All project actions were designed to minimize risk and be “uncancellable.” 
• This mission was executed as a cost-capped project and everybody acted accordingly. We never did something 
and thought, “We will go back and get money for that later.” 
Following the confirmation to proceed in 2006, we executed WISE on schedule and on budget. The development 
schedule (Figure 4) shows activities in calendar year (CY) quarters with the durations that we actually experienced. We 
will complete survey operations at the end of CY2010 and will deliver preliminary data products to NASA’s Infrared 
Science Archive (IRSA) in quarter 2 of 2011 and final data products to IRSA in quarter 2 of 2012. We will provide 
6 months of user support following data product delivery, after which the WISE project work will be completed. 
 
Figure 4. Development schedule 
3 MANAGEMENT TEAM AND APPROACH 
We believe that the success of the WISE project from a management point of view can be attributed to the following 
features: 1) Clear, harmonious governance; 2) efficient and frequent communication; 3) an inclusive teamwork 
management approach and 4) streamlined and targeted oversight. 
3.1 Governance 
The WISE management team (co-authors) is highlighted in the WISE development organization chart shown in Figure 5. 
As an Explorer mission, WISE is led by the PI from UCLA. The PI also leads the WISE science team and oversees the 
Education and Public Outreach program, which is carried out for him by the Space Sciences Laboratory at the University 
of California, Berkeley. The Project Scientist assists the PI and represents him within the JPL organization. 
While the PI has overall responsibility for project resources and mission success, he has delegated substantial authority 
to implement the project to the project manager at JPL. This has resulted in a very complementary and effective 
management partnership with no ambiguity and little overlap with respect to roles and authority. The PI has functioned 
much as would a “chairman of the board,” whereas the project manager has functioned as the “chief executive officer.” 
The suitability of these roles to the specific individuals involved has been a crucial element in the successful 
management of the WISE project. The benefits of the quality of this partnership cannot be overstated. 
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 JPL’s flight system manager and payload manager function as contract technical managers (CTM) for BATC and SDL 
contracts with JPL, respectively. Each CTM conducts a monthly management review (MMR) within the element, which 
is open to everyone on the project. During the MMR, each subsystem reports detailed technical achievement, near-term 
planning and milestone and earned value (EV) status, including schedule and cost variances. Each CTM also hosts 
weekly tag-up teleconferences to discuss any issues of interest.  
Clear lines of authority and responsibility also extend downward from the project manager to the other project leaders. 
This tight governance structure has proven to be valuable in overcoming challenges, because decisions could be made in 
a timely way and implementation of these decisions has been rapid. 
 
Figure 5. WISE project organization (management team and co-authors of this paper are shown in italics) 
3.2 Communication 
The WISE project leadership has promoted open, frank and civil communication among all organizations and people. 
The JPL project manager chairs a monthly face-to-face (FTF) project coordination meeting with the other members of 
the management team. This FTF meeting provides a regular forum to exchange opinions and to thoroughly discuss 
important strategic issues. Perhaps more importantly it serves as a regular team-building event, reminding us of our 
common goals, enhancing mutual understanding and removing unnecessary barriers between organizations. The meeting 
venue rotates among the various members’ home institutions. In keeping the open management approach, the project 
manager maintains an open book on project budget reserve status and lien list, which are reviewed by the entire 
management team at each FTF meeting. Although all budget reserve is held by the project manager, this practice 
effectively promotes shared responsibility, ownership and mutual trust. The WISE project manager also conducts a 
2 hour monthly project element status review where all mission elements report recent progress, upcoming events, 
schedule and milestone status, on-going issues and mitigation plans.  
Open communication facilitates strict scope and change control. This is made possible by clearly established contractual 
agreements and associated roles and responsibilities. Scope and budgetary baselines are established at all levels down to 
individual tasks. The CTM authorizes any scope changes for his or her element. The WISE project manager and PI 
control project budget reserve. If additional budget resource is required, the CTM submits a lien request against the 
project reserve. Out-of-scope tasks can only be performed after the project manager approves the associated lien. 
A weekly mission support engineering team telecon led by the project system engineer addresses all important technical 
and design issues, technical documents and engineering change requests. 
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 3.3 Teamwork 
WISE mission development required close collaboration among a large number of organizations spread around the 
country. The teaming arrangement, which originated in the proposal phase, leveraged the strength of each participating 
organization based on its recent experience and proven track record.  
The successful implementation of a mission like WISE ultimately comes down to the people and their teamwork. It is 
common for a WISE team member to function in multiple support roles in addition to his or her main role. We share a 
culture of helping each other. This has been essential to the success of WISE as a cost-capped project with limited 
resources. 
Special engineering teams were formed as needed to resolve engineering issues that required coordinated efforts across 
elements. WISE mission success strongly demonstrates that the best technical oversight is achieved when engineers and 
other team members work closely to accomplish engineering design and problem solving. Special engineering team 
membership was not limited to the engineers assigned explicitly to the project; rather, the teams included experts from 
the JPL technical divisions and other non-JPL affiliations. 
3.4 Oversight 
The word “oversight” can have negative connotations since oversight is often conducted indiscriminately and 
inefficiently. If done properly, it can facilitate communication of objectives and status with the sponsor (NASA) and 
within the project, ensuring that the necessary resources are brought to bear when problems arise. WISE has benefited 
from constructive internal and external oversight. Our policy has been to employ tough, expert, informed, civil and 
constructive reviewers; and, in consultation with NASA and the JPL technical divisions, we did our best to find the most 
experienced experts, regardless of affiliation. We considered reviewers to be successful if the project team was grateful 
for their attention and input. 
Performance with respect to an integrated budget and schedule baseline is tracked using an EV system. Since EV reports 
indicate status many weeks in the past, WISE uses, in parallel, a milestone reporting system to facilitate timely schedule 
management. At the beginning of each fiscal year, each element submits a set of meaningful schedule milestones (the 
number being proportional to its budget) for the next 12 months. The project manager tracks these milestones weekly to 
gauge project schedule performance in near real time. This simple approach has been very effective for us and, if 
rigorously applied, could replace EV for projects of this size.  
The WISE project followed JPL policies and guidelines for conducting technical and programmatic reviews. An 
independent and integrated review team (IIRT) served as the review board for all NASA-mandated reviews, such as 
preliminary design review and critical design reviews. The IIRT was co-chaired by non-JPL experts, and the members 
are subject-matter experts mostly from outside of JPL. Selected IIRT members participated in element and subsystem 
reviews. This provided useful tie points to the higher-level reviews in which they participated. Review findings and 
requests for action (RFAs) from project reviews are recorded, tracked, and closed only with the concurrence from the 
initiators. By its own policy, the project never rejected an RFA; and we always responded to each reviewer as a courtesy. 
In addition to higher-level reviews, WISE often employed and significantly benefited from in-depth peer reviews at 
subsystem or lower levels, and at each stage of design maturity.  
4 RESULTS 
4.1 Flight system performance 
WISE on-orbit performance has been excellent, with all systems performing at or near specifications. Following BATC’s 
heritage practice, the launch configuration for WISE had the spacecraft avionics and most of the attitude determination 
and control subsystem (ADCS, which includes inertial measurement units, reaction wheels and torque rods) powered. 
This means that flight software was running at launch vehicle separation; and the full capability of the spacecraft was 
available to damp the tip-off rates, control the attitude of the spacecraft and point the solar array to the Sun. The tip-off 
rates were damped within a few minutes of separation. Additionally, as soon as flight software detected launch vehicle 
separation, the on-board autonomous launch sequence turned on the S-band transceiver to establish command and 
telemetry communication with the ground. The communication link was established within seconds after the transceiver 
was powered on. Telemetry indicated that indeed the solar array was pointed toward the Sun, the spacecraft was power 
positive and ADCS and avionics were fully up and running. The final activity that was performed in the launch sequence 
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 was the opening of the cryostat pyro-actuated vent valves. Each of the two cryostat tanks has a parallel set of valves. For 
WISE to function properly, at least one valve on each tank needed to open. The valves were autonomously powered and 
successfully fired 20 minutes after separation. The cryostat temperatures cooled as expected based on analysis of WISE 
ground test data and the prior experience of Lockheed Martin Advanced Technology Center and SDL teams with Spirit-
III. Within the first hour of the WISE mission, significant spacecraft and payload performance had been demonstrated! 
During the next few days of operations, we powered up the star trackers and successfully performed various calibrations 
of the ADCS to enable science-quality pointing. Following ADCS calibration, we commanded WISE to slew to one of 
the TDRSS, the Ku-band transmitter was powered and the high-speed science data downlink was verified, with link 
margins better than expected.  
Following a successful Earth avoidance fault protection test, the telescope aperture cover was successfully ejected on 
December 29, 2009; the payload was powered on 45 minutes after ejection, images were collected and, when the 
Ku-band data came down that night, many happy WISE astronomers saw stars!  
Over the next two weeks, we checked out the payload performance more thoroughly. During this time we determined 
that the scan mirror had significant non-linearity. The scan mirror is one of the few elements on WISE that has 
redundancy, so there is an A-side and B-side set of electronics. Additionally, also based on experience gained during 
Spirit-III, L-3 Communications SSG-Tinsley had designed the WISE scan mirror so that the linearity correction 
coefficients could be re-programmed from the ground. After much discussion, we decided to test the B-side electronics 
for linearity prior to committing to re-programming the coefficients. Luckily, the B-side linearity performance was 
adequate, so now the entire WISE was up and working. The WISE survey commenced on January 14, 2010. Analysis of 
the WISE science data indicates that image quality has exceeded performance (without a focus adjustment mechanism). 
The four WISE bands are also performing well, with sensitivities that range from better than requirement to just missing 
the requirement in band 4 (see section 4.5). Calibration coefficients continue to be refined as the survey proceeds. 
Thanks to the highly experienced WISE team and appropriate use of heritage, the overall WISE flight system performs 
well and in many areas exceeds expectations.  
Lesson Learned #4: STICK WITH HERITAGE IF POSSIBLE. 
• We minimized risk by adopting designs based on credible inheritance. 
• Cryogenics: SDL, Lockheed Palo Alto Research Laboratory (Spirit III, WIRE) 
• Detectors: DRS Technologies, Inc., Teledyne Technologies, Inc. (Spitzer, Hubble Space Telescope) 
• Spacecraft: BATC (Deep Impact, NEXTSat) 
• Mission Operations: JPL (TOPEX/Poseidon, Jason-1) 
• Science Data Processing: Caltech-IPAC (IRAS, 2MASS, Spitzer) 
• We implemented a mature concept that had been thought through and proposed many times earlier. 
• We resisted the urge to improve the design following selection. 
4.2 Mission Operations System (MOS) Development 
Mission operations and science data processing have gone very smoothly since launch. Early spacecraft commissioning 
operations were completed on time with only a few surprises. Survey operations have been routine with no significant 
spacecraft or ground anomalies. We recognized early in WISE development that the flight and ground systems needed to 
work “out of the box” since lifetime was limited by the cryogenic lifetime. Any time spent troubleshooting on orbit was 
sky lost to the survey. Therefore, MOS was fully funded and engaged in the early phases of the project. Design of the 
onboard science processing and data flow included MOS participation, resulting in a system that is robust and easy to 
operate. Early development of fully functional ground data system (GDS) proto-types and an instrument simulator 
allowed end-to-end–like data flow tests as early as board-and-box–level testing with full support of the test concept by 
hardware suppliers. Early development of MOS software for survey planning and spacecraft pointing gave us confidence 
that our operations concepts were correct and that the spacecraft could be operated safely in a very constrained pointing 
environment. 
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 MOS was also an integral part and active participant in the definition of the test program, which allowed for a significant 
amount of time for mission scenario tests that allowed the GDS and MOS teams to learn how to operate the flight system 
and to verify operations concepts. Remote connections between assembly, test and launch operations staff and Mission 
Operations Control allowed the MOS team to monitor all on-going test activities, including environmental tests, thereby 
gaining experience with actual flight hardware behavior and providing additional eyes on test data. 
Early and continuous interactions between instrument developers, science data processing and science team members 
provided excellent understanding of instrument data and allowed calibration activities to proceed smoothly. These 
interactions were essential in allowing us to rapidly characterize the instrument data after launch and complete the early 
science data processing to cope with the very large amount (50 GB) of image data received each day. The complexities 
and few surprises encountered by the science data center were handled rapidly and effectively. Figure 6 shows typical 
raw images and the resulting false-color processed image. This illustrates the extent to which image artifacts exist and 
are successfully removed from the final data products. Rapid image processing and quality evaluation have been crucial 
to making adjustments that promise to lead to the best possible survey with our instrument. 
 
Figure 6. Left: Level-0 (top) and level-1 (bottom) single-exposure frames in the 12 (left) and 23 (right) micron bands. The 
level-0 frames display quadrant droop, pixel response variation, and many latent images, all largely calibrated out in the 
level-1 frames. Right: Color image resulting from the level-1 4.6 (blue), 12 (green) and 22 (red) micron bands for the same 
field. 
Lesson Learned #5 CONCURRENT MOS DESIGN AND TESTING LEADS TO SMOOTH MISSION 
OPERATIONS. 
• We have achieved our all-sky survey objective because of an early commitment to the development and test of 
operational elements. 
4.3 A near project-ending test failure 
WISE experienced one serious, potentially project-ending, technical issue during its development: the structural failure 
of the payload thermal mass dynamics simulator (TMDS). Since environmental testing involving a solid-hydrogen–filled 
cryostat would require extensive and expensive safety measures in the test facility, we chose to build a high-fidelity 
TMDS and use it in place of the flight payload during the flight system structure and dynamic tests and thermal vacuum 
tests. The structure of the TMDS was identical in all relevant respects to the flight cryostat and provided a high-fidelity 
external thermal interface to the spacecraft. In addition to relaxing facility safety requirements, this approach allowed 
maximum time for the flight payload to be thoroughly tested and qualified prior to its final integration with the flight 
spacecraft. Subsequent system tests were limited to electromagnetic interference/compatibility tests and acoustic test.  
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 4.4 Risk management 
Our project policy (and JPL’s policy) was to limit mission risk to a level consistent with NASA’s risk Class C.6 The 
written policy specifies implementation specifics that grow in conservatism as the project grows in criticality. JWST, for 
example, is a Class A risk mission. 
Risk management is a crucial and multifaceted activity on a project such as WISE. It includes providing for adequate 
budget (26% at confirmation) and schedule reserves (17% at confirmation), choosing a spares philosophy, selecting 
appropriate preflight model developments, establishing performance and test margins and selecting key high-risk areas 
for intensive oversight and independent review along with many other routine risk management tasks. We performed the 
full range of routine risk management activities on WISE. In this paper, however, we focus our discussion on a specific 
and particularly important and somewhat controversial risk management decision that is typical of many other decisions 
like it that ultimately account for our programmatic success. In the case of WISE, this decision made it possible to meet 
budget, schedule and performance commitments. All of these decisions have a common element: we chose to defer 
testing to higher levels of assembly in order to maintain schedule. Although these decisions added future budget risk, in 
no case did they increase mission risk. We were able to make these decisions because of our effective governance 
arrangement and the autonomy that resulted from our risk classification. A description of a specific illustrative case 
follows. 
During the course of the telescope acceptance testing at SDL’s vendor, we encountered difficulties in verifying the focus 
position of the telescope at operational cryogenic temperatures. The majority of testing was to be performed at liquid 
nitrogen (LN2) temperatures (~77 K), with only a single cool down to the WISE flight-like operating temperature of ~17 
K. We were unable to get conclusive data that image quality and focus position met specification. We were hampered by 
test facility features that were not flight-like, including insufficient cold shielding resulting in higher-than-expected test 
temperatures (100 K rather than 77 K for LN2 cooling); a higher-than-expected emissivity from the gold-coated chamber 
windows, resulting in external heat load– induced optical gradients of 2–5 K and ~3.5 waves of power due to CTE 
mismatch between the metering structure and its thermal paint; and limited measurement reliability due to the large 
number of interferometric fringes associated with a double pass measurement with ~3.5 waves of power. This 
measurement uncertainty made it difficult to correlate performance test data with model predictions, so we had 
inadequate confidence in the results. Although the contract with the vendor was fixed price, we decided to ship the 
telescope to SDL and test it after integration into the cryostat, where its environment was far more flight-like. Figure 8 
shows the partially tested telescope installed in the cryostat prior to final acceptance testing. It also shows the test 
arrangement at SDL in which the telescope is tested in its flight configuration (except for a window at the end of the 
cryo-cooled “blue tube”). 
 
Figure 8. Telescope testing after delivery to SDL 
The decision to test the telescope at SDL saved our schedule but came with risks: the vendor was relieved of its fixed 
price commitment; and discovery of a problem at SDL would have required shipping the telescope back to the vendor for 
rework, resulting in additional vendor costs and substantial overall cost growth. This scenario did not come to pass; in 
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 Further information about WISE and updates on mission progress can be found at http://wise.astro.ucla.edu/. 
 
 
Figure 11. Sky coverage as of June 2, 2010. The image shows the current progress of the WISE all-sky survey, as measured 
by successfully processed frames. The pinkish band represents the portion of the sky that WISE has surveyed and processed. 
The light blue colored areas have (mostly) not yet been seen by WISE. The scale on the bottom shows the density of the 
coverage. For example, the most red portions indicate heavy coverage whereas purple/blue portions indicate a lighter 
coverage. The image is a map of the sky in a Mollweide projection centered on the Milky Way Galaxy. The blue areas in the 
WISE map at the center of the Milky Way were surveyed by WISE, but not yet processed, because the high density of stars 
required retuning the processing parameters. Reprocessing is now under way. 
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